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2Abstract
Stackelberg diﬀerential games are useful settings in which optimal gov-
ernment policies can be studied. This paper argues that the analysis of these
games involves a key technical issue. In particular, we question the necessity
for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature. The
issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible
for the time inconsistency results previously obtained. We show that the
boundary condition is not necessary in some cases. As a result, our ﬁnding
undermines the credibility of the existing conclusions. Journal of Economic
Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C61, E62, H21.
31 Introduction
Stackelberg diﬀerential games have often been used to study dynamic inter-
action between government and private agents. The government naturally
plays the role of the leader, setting monetary and ﬁscal policies. Private
agents are the followers, responding optimally to government policy in their
decision on consumption, investment, labor supply and so on. The govern-
ment then takes the private agents’ best response into account and forms the
optimal policy. Examples using such a framework can be found in Kydland
and Prescott [10], Calvo [4], Turnovsky and Brock [15], Lucas and Stokey
[11], Chamley [7], and Persson, Persson and Svensson [13].
The pioneering work by Kydland and Prescott [10] has created the “time
inconsistency” literature, which generally falls into two categories. In the
ﬁrst category, the studies determine which optimal government policies tend
to be time inconsistent. Calvo [4], Turnovsky and Brock [15] and Chamley
[7] are examples in this category.
In the second category, the studies examine the debt instruments the
incumbent government can use to bind the action of its successor and thus
ensure time consistency. Lucas and Stokey [11] and Persson, Persson and
Svensson [13] are representative.
The work in the second category carries an optimistic tone that the time
inconsistent optimal policy can be made time consistent through intentional
debt management by governments. A technical error found in Persson, Pers-
son and Svensson [13] shatters such a hope (see Calvo and Obstfeld [6]). Re-
cent attempts in characterizing time consistent policies without commitment
include Calvo and Guidotti [5], Benhabib and Rustichini [1] and Benhabib,
4Rustichini and Velasco [2]. Calvo and Guidotti show that a second-best
incentive compatible outcome can be reached by manipulating government
debt maturity. Benhabib et al. show that incentive compatible outcomes can
be maintained through reputational mechanisms and they conduct numerical
analysis to see how diﬀerences in taxes with and without commitment are
aﬀected by parameter changes.
The work in the ﬁrst category also suﬀers from technical inadequacy as
this paper will argue. Unless the issue raised here is resolved, the results
obtained in a number of existing papers remain questionable.
To put it simply, the technical inadequacy lies in a failure to prove that the
boundary conditions imposed in various papers are necessary for optimality.
In particular, we show that one of the boundary conditions is not necessary
in some cases. Since this boundary condition is responsible for deriving time
inconsistency, our ﬁnding calls for caution.
This paper only points out a problem but does not oﬀer a solution. We
hope that this paper serves the same purpose as the counter-example in Shell
[14]: The Shell example questions the necessity of a transversality condition
for optimality in inﬁnite horizon and has served as a challenge which leads
to the full resolution of the problem by Weitzman [16] in discrete time and
Benveniste and Scheinkman [3] in continuous time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a dy-
namic taxation model as a Stackelberg diﬀerential game. Section 3 uses the
boundary conditions that are usually imposed in the literature and obtain
the time inconsistency result. Section 4 uses a special parametric example of
the model which permits explicit solution to show that one of the boundary
condition imposed in Section 3 is not necessary for optimality. Thus the
conclusion of time inconsistency reached in Section 3 is spurious. Section 5
discusses the generality of our ﬁnding. Section 6 contains an example which
5shows that the technical issue can arise in the original Chamley framework.
Section 7 concludes.
2A M o d e l o f D y n a m i c T a x a t i o n
We consider an economy populated with a continuum of identical private
agents. These agents are consumers-cum-producers and can be represented
by a set {α : α ∈ [0,1]}. They produce a single good which is either
consumed or invested as capital for later production. Production function
for an individual is given by y = f(k)w h e r ek is capital and y is output.
Government imposes only an output tax, the entire path of which, {τ(t) ∈
[0,1]: t ≥ 0}, is announced at time zero. Government spending is in the form
of public goods. We require that the government budget be balanced each




f(kα(t))τ(t) dα, for all t ≥ 0, (1)
where g is the amount of public good, kα is the capital stock of individual α.
For an individual α, his optimal consumption and investment plan is the







subject to ˙ kα = f(kα)(1 − τ) − cα, with kα0 given, (3)
where cα is individual α’s consumption; the utility functions, U(·)a n dV (·),
and the production function, f(·), are concave and strictly increasing. Fur-
thermore, U0(0) = V 0(0) = +∞.
6We can characterize the response of individual α to government tax policy
by a set of ﬁrst order conditions and a transversality condition. To do this,
we use the Hamiltonian:
Hα =[ U(cα)+V (g)] + qα [f(kα)(1 − τ) − cα]. (4)
Note that g depends on the action of the entire population (see Eq. (1))




˙ qα = ρqα − qαf
0(kα)(1 − τ). (6)
The transversality condition is kαqαe−ρt → 0a st →∞ .
For each path {τ(t) ∈ [0,1]: t ≥ 0} that the government announces,
there is a corresponding optimal plan of resource allocation over time by each
individual. Since all individuals are assumed to be identical, the subscript α
can be removed from the equations above and the optimal response of private
agents can thus be rewritten as follows:
U
0(c)=q (7)
˙ k = f(k)(1 − τ) − c (8)
˙ q = ρq − qf
0(k)(1 − τ)( 9 )
k0 given and lim
t→∞kqe
−ρt =0 . (10)
In equilibrium, Eq. (1) reduces to
g = f(k)τ. (11)
Assume the government shares the same objective function with the repre-
sentative individual. If we invert Eq. (7) to obtain c = c(q), we can write





[U(c(q)) + V (f(k)τ)] e
−ρt dt,
subject to: ˙ k = f(k)(1 − τ) − c(q) (12)
˙ q = ρq − qf
0(k)(1 − τ) (13)
k0 given and lim
t→∞kqe
−ρt = 0 (14)
This maximization problem has some peculiar aspects. First, the objective
function may not be concave in q. Second, the boundary conditions include
a transversality condition at inﬁnity. As a result, there are no ready-made
necessary boundary conditions we can apply for (Problem G).
The ﬁrst order conditions should still be straightforward to derive. Let λ








00(k)(1 − τ) (16)
˙ ξ = ρξ − qc
0(q)+λc
0(q) − ξ(ρ − f
0(k)(1 − τ)) (17)
In the next section, we will see how the boundary conditions convention-
ally imposed imply time inconsistency of optimal government tax policy.
3 Necessary Boundary Conditions
As mentioned in the last section, (Problem G) is not a standard maximization
problem. The necessity of the boundary conditions ought to be established
rigorously. The special aspects of (Problem G) have not received any atten-
tion and researchers simply apply their intuition when selecting the boundary
conditions.
8If we follow Turnovsky and Brock [15], we should impose two transver-
sality conditions: kλe−ρt → 0a n dqξe−ρt → 0. Chamley [7, 8] did not
impose similar conditions explicitly, but since convergence to steady state is
assumed, he may have imposed the transversality conditions implicitly. If
we follow Chamley, we should also impose a third condition: ξ0 =0 . T h e
rationale given in Chamley [7, 8] for imposing ξ0 =0i st h a tq0 seems free to
move. Persson and Svensson [12] uses this same boundary condition based
on the same rationale.
With ξ0 = 0 imposed as a necessary condition for optimality, the optimal
government policy must be time inconsistent. We put this in a proposition.
Proposition 1: If ξ0 =0is necessary for optimality, the optimal govern-
ment policy is time inconsistent.
Proof: Suppose the optimal government policy is time consistent. We
proceed in ﬁnding a contradiction. In fact time consistency and the necessity
of ξ0 = 0 imply that the solution to (Problem G) must have the property that
ξ(t) ≡ 0 for all t. Eq. (17) then implies that λ(t) ≡ q(t) for all t.W i t ht h i s
result in mind, we see that equations (13) and (16) imply V 0(f(k)τ)f0(k)τ ≡
0. Since V (·)a n df(·) are strictly increasing, it must be the case that τ ≡ 0.
The zero tax policy however cannot be optimal because V 0(0) = +∞.W e
have found a contradiction. Thus the optimal government policy is time
inconsistent.
Remark: The time inconsistency results obtained in Chamley [7, 8] and
Persson and Svensson [12] critically depend on the necessity of a boundary
condition equivalent to ξ0 = 0. In the next section, we will use a parametric
version of our model to show that ξ0 = 0 is not necessary in some cases.
94A C o u n t e r E x a m p l e
In the last section, we showed that the conventional use of the boundary
condition ξ0 = 0 leads to the straightforward conclusion of time inconsistency.
We will show in this section that imposing ξ0 = 0 as a necessary condition
for optimality is spurious.
The parametric class of examples we have is: U(c)=[ c1−σ−1]/(1−σ)a n d
f(k)=Akσ where 0 < σ ≤ 1a n dA>01. The simplest case in which σ =1
is suﬃcient to demonstrate our argument. In this case, our representative
individual has log utility and linear production:
U(c)=l n ( c),V (g)=l n ( g),f (k)=Ak.
The private agents’ behavior is now characterized by:
1/c = q (18)
˙ k = Ak(1 − τ) − c (19)
˙ q = ρq − qA(1 − τ) (20)
k0 given, and kqe
−ρt → 0. (21)
Eq. (18) implies that c(q)=1 /q. Substitute this into (19) and multiply
through the equation by q. Add ˙ qk to each side, then substitute out ˙ q on the
RHS from (20). This leaves
d(qk)/dt = ρqk − 1.
1This particular class of utility-production pairs, indexed by σ,c a no f t e nb eu s e dt o







with J an arbitrary constant. However, the transversality condition then
implies that J =0 . H e n c ew eh a v e :
q =1 /(ρk) (22)
Because of this link between k and q, there are now two ways to solve
(Problem G). First, we can substitute q =1 /(ρk)i n t o( P r o b l e mG )s ot h a t
it becomes a concave optimal control problem with a single state variable k




[ln(ρk)+l n ( Akτ)]e
−ρtdt,
subject to ˙ k = Ak(1 − τ) − ρk,a n dk0 given.







Alternatively, if the substitution q =1 /(ρk)i sn o tm a d e ,( P r o b l e mG )
is an optimal control problem with two state variables, k and q,a n do n e
control variable τ as described in the last section. The corresponding ﬁrst
order conditions are:
τ =1 /[(kλ − ξq)A] (24)
˙ k = Ak(1 − τ) − 1/q (25)
˙ q = ρq − qA(1 − τ) (26)
11˙ λ = ρλ − 1/k − λA(1 − τ) (27)
˙ ξ = ρξ +1 /q − λ/q
2 − ξ(ρ − A(1 − τ)) (28)
The known necessary boundary conditions are: k0 given, and kqe−ρt → 0,
as t →∞ . What are the other necessary boundary conditions for optimality?
In particular, is the condition ξ0 = 0 really necessary?
The merit of this example is that one can actually solve the diﬀerential
equations above (as in Appendix A) for the general solution. The resulting





where Ω denotes limt→∞ qξe−ρt.
The two approaches to solving (Problem G) must yield the same solution.
This requires Ω = limt→∞ qξe−ρt = 0 by comparing Eq. (29) with (23). The
condition ξ0 = 0 is clearly not necessary. As a result, the conventional
argument to explain why optimal government policies are time inconsistent
is incorrect in this example. It is easily veriﬁed that the optimal tax policy,
τ = ρ/(2A), is in fact time consistent.
The intuition which explains why the condition ξ0 = 0 is not necessary
for optimality is as follows. In our example, since we have q =1 /(ρk), q0
equals 1/(ρk0) and is thus independent of the tax policy. In other words,
q0 is non-controllable by {τ(t) ∈ [0,1]: t ≥ 0}. The condition ξ0 =0i s
n e c e s s a r yo n l yi fq0 is controllable in the sense that q0 can be moved around
by changing the tax policy.
What happens in a more general case when σ ∈ (0,1)? Is q0 still non-
controllable? We have the following proposition.
12Proposition 2. When 0 < σ < 1, the private agents’ best response to the
government tax policy has the property that q =[ σ/(ρk)]
σ. Therefore, q0 is
determined by k0 and is non-controllable by government tax policies.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark: Proposition 2 indicates that the conclusion in the special case
when σ = 1 carries through to the more general case when σ ∈ (0,1). Thus
for any σ ∈ (0,1], q0 is non-controllable. As a result, ξ0 = 0 is not necessary
and the optimal tax policy is time consistent.
Note that when σ ∈ (0,1), both the utility function and the production
function are well behaved and satisfy the usual assumptions. Therefore, it is
diﬃcult to rule the class of counter examples out. With general utility and
production functions, explicit solution is impossible. Thus studies that allow
us to identify a priori whether q0 is controllable can help us understand time
inconsistency.
5 Generality of Our Result
In the last section we showed that q0 = 0 is not necessary for optimality for
a class of utility-production pairs indexed by σ.T h i si sb e c a u s ew i t ht h e s e
pairs, q0 is non-controllable. There may be other utility-production pairs
with the same property. Time inconsistency result can only be trusted when
these pairs are excluded. Therefore further studies are needed to identify the
cases for exclusion. The following proposition is a start.
Proposition 3. Let U(·)a n df(·) be concave and strictly increasing with
f(0) = 0. If
f(k)U
0 [ρf(k)/f
0(k)] ≡ J, a constant, (30)
13then q0 is non-controllable.
Proof: We will show that c(t)=ρf(k(t))/f0(k(t)) is private agents’ optimal
choice for consumption regardless of {τ(t) ∈ [0,1]: t ≥ 0}.H e n c e q0 =
U0(c(0)) = J/f(k0) is non-controllable.
Diﬀerentiate Eq. (30) with respect to k.T h er e s u l tc a nt h e nb eu s e dt o
verify that the consumption choice above satisﬁes all the ﬁrst order conditions
(7) to (9). It thus remains to show that the transversality condition is also
satisﬁed. Note that q(t)=U0(c(t)) = J/f(k(t)). All we need to show is
limt→∞ Jk(t)e−ρt/f(k(t)) = 0. Eq. (8) implies that ˙ k ≥− ρf(k)/f0(k). Thus
f(k(t)) ≥ f(k0)e
−ρt when k0 > 0.
Since f(·) is strictly increasing, the above inequality implies that k(t) > 0
for all t. Let z(t)d e n o t ek(t)/f(k(t)). Then we have z(t) > 0f o ra l lt and:
˙ z = ˙ k [1 − f0(k)k/f(k)]/f(k)
=[ f(k)(1 − τ) − ρf(k)/f0(k)][1 − f0(k)k/f(k)]/f(k)
≤ [1 − f0(k)k/f(k)]
≤ 1
where the ﬁrst inequality is derived from three facts: (i) τ ∈ [0,1]; (ii)
k(t) > 0; (iii) 1−f0(k)k/f(k) ≥ 0 due to the concavity of f(·)a n df(0) = 0.
Thus we obtain 0 <z (t) ≤ z(0) + t , which implies that limt→∞ kqe−ρt =
limt→∞ Jk(t)e−ρt/f(k(t)) = limt→∞ ze−ρt =0 .
Remark: The above proof is fast paced. Note that for U(c)=( c1−σ −
1)/(1 − σ)a n df(k)=Akσ, Eq. (30) holds. Thus Proposition 2 is a special
case of Proposition 3. In Appendix B, Proposition 2 is shown in a leisurely
style for easy grasp.
I nt h ec a s ew h e nq0 is controllable, ξ0 = 0 is necessary for optimality and
time inconsistency occurs. In order to characterize the optimal policy so that
14it may be compared with the sub-optimal ones, we need to know about other
necessary boundary conditions. In particular, are limt→∞ kλe−ρt =0a n d
limt→∞ qξe−ρt = 0 necessary for optimality? If they are, then we have ﬁve
boundary conditions on a system of four diﬀerential equations. This suggests
the possibility that the system is over-determined.
In our special example when σ =1 ,w eﬁnd that limt→∞ qξe−ρt =0i sa
necessary condition for optimality. On the other hand, limt→∞ kλe−ρt =0
is automatically satisﬁed when limt→∞ kqe−ρt = 0 is imposed (Appendix A
shows that kλ = B − t with B a constant). Will this always happen and
therefore we need not explicitly impose limt→∞ kλe−ρt = 0 as a boundary
condition?
To summarize, current understanding on Stackelberg diﬀerential games is
limited. Diﬀerent authors have diﬀerent ideas about which boundary condi-
tions are necessary for optimality. Turnovsky and Brock [15] did not impose
ξ0 =0( q3(0) = 0 in their notation) whereas Chamley [7, 8] and Persson and
Svensson [12] did. We deﬁnitely need to establish rigorously which boundary
conditions are necessary for optimality and when.
6 The Chamley Framework
To be sure, the optimal taxation model studied thus far is diﬀerent from
that in the original Chamley [8]. Our model has public goods in the utility
function and assumes no government bonds. While this model is interesting
in its own right, it would be more convincing if we can present a counter-
example in Chamley’s own framework showing that the conclusion of time-
inconsistency can be spurious for some speciﬁcation of functional forms. We
are also interested to see whether Chamley’s result that asymptotic capital
incomes taxes are zero is still correct.




−ρt ln[c − l] dt (31)
where c is consumption and l is the eﬀort put into work.




where k is the capital stock.
Given real interest rate r and the real wage w,t h eﬁrm maximizes its




w =( 1− α)Ak
αl
−α (34)
As before, we ﬁrst study the private agent’s utility maximization problem
and then ask what tax policies the government should adopt. Deﬁne a as an
individual’s total wealth, a = k + b,w h e r eb is the government bonds that
this individual holds. For a given series of {τk(t), τl(t)}
∞
0 , the representative
agent maximizes (31) subject to
˙ a = r(1 − τk)a + w(1 − τl)l − c (35)
with a0 = k0 + b0 given.















= qw(1 − τl) (37)
˙ q = ρq − qr(1 − τk) (38)
The initial condition and the transversality condition is
a0 given and aqe
−ρt → 0 (39)
Equations (36) and (37) imply:
w(1 − τl) = 1 (40)
and




Substituting (40) and (41) into the wealth accumulation equation, we obtain,
˙ a = r(1 − τk)a −
1
q














This tight relationship between a and q once again demonstrates that con-
trollability problem can also arise in the original Chamley framework. If
we followed what Chamley does, namely imposing ξ0 =0( ξ is the co-state
variable on q) as a necessary condition in the government problem, we would
immediately obtain time-inconsistency. This conclusion of time-inconsistency
is however spurious because now we know that whenever controllability prob-
lem arises, ξ0 = 0 is not necessary.
17To see whether Chamley’s result that asymptotic capital incomes taxes
are zero still holds, let us continue with the example and ﬁnd out more about
the private agent’s decisions.
Equations (41) and (42) imply that
c − l = ρa (43)





l =[ ( 1− α)A(1 − τl)]
1/α k




= αA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α k
wl =( 1 − α)Ak
αl
−α
=( 1 − α)A[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
/α k
Because of the tight relationship between a and q and the fact that c−l =






subject to ˙ a =( 1 − τk)αA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α a − ρa
˙ b = g − τkαA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α a
−τl(1 − α)A[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α (a − b)
+αA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α b
τk ≤ 1
a0 and b0 given
18Where g is the exogenous government spending and is assumed to be






1w h e nt<T
0w h e nt ≥ T
τl =0 f o r a l l t











where r is the pre-tax real interest rate αA[(1 − α)A]
(1−α)/α.






Eq. (44) is intuitive. It says that the higher the government spending,
the longer the regime of 100% capital income taxation will have to last. Also,
the more debt the government inherits at time zero, the longer the regime of
100% capital income taxation will have to last.
To summarize, Chamley’s result that τk is asymptotically zero still holds
in our special example. But his claim that after time T,t h eg o v e r n m e n t
spending is ﬁnanced by labor income tax seems wrong4. This claim also
provides the intuition for his time inconsistency result stated in his concluding
paragraph that a government may be tempted to raise revenues by future
3If g grows at a rate lower than the real interest rate, similar analysis can be done. We
need to ﬁnd a T so that b(T)i ss u ﬃciently negative and b grows at the same rate as the
government spending for t ≥ T.
4Chamley [8] does not have any discription of the optimal wage tax but does claim that
the government spending after time T is ﬁnanced only by taxing wage income (page 617).
19levies on capital. Our special example illustrates that in some cases q0 is non-
controllable and thus ξ0 = 0 is not a necessary condition for optimality in the
government problem. This destroys the time inconsistency result technically.
Not only that, the example also destroys time inconsistency result intuitively.
After time T, the government owns enough assets (b suﬃciently negative)
so that the government spending can be entirely ﬁnanced by its interest
earnings. The government has no incentive to lengthen the regime of 100%
capital income taxation. The length of this regime, T, is chosen optimally
once and for all.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Due to the nature and complexity of Stackelberg diﬀerential games, which
boundary conditions are necessary for optimality is an unresolved issue. This
paper shows that the current treatment of the issue is not rigorous and con-
clusion of time inconsistency could be spurious in some cases.
Since the question of the necessity of boundary conditions is directly
related to the time inconsistency result, we must ﬁnd the answer. This
paper puts the question forward in a series of examples. As in Shell [14],
these examples are very special and are unlikely to be realistic. This does not
mean that we can aﬀord to neglect them. In fact, powerful counter-examples
are always special and unexpected. We hope that our counter-examples will
attract eﬀort for the early resolution of the technical issue in Stackelberg
diﬀerential games.
20Appendix A
Here we derive the general solution for the set of diﬀerential equations
(25) to (28) with the known necessary boundary conditions: k0 given and
limt→∞ kqe−ρt =0
As shown in the main text, equations (25), (26) and the transversal-
ity condition limt→∞ kqe−ρt =0i m p l yt h a tq =1 /(ρk). Substitute q =
1/(ρk) into (25). Equations (25) and (27) can then be re-arranged to obtain
d(kλ)/dt = −1. Thus kλ = B − t,where B is any constant. Hence, we can
substitute λ =( B−t)/k =( B−t)ρq into (28) and solve (26) and (28) for ξq.









which gives the general solution depending on the choice of the value for Ω.
21Appendix B
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 2 using three lemmas.
When σ ∈ (0,1), the ﬁrst order conditions characterizing the private
agents’ behavior are as follows:
c
−σ = q (45)
˙ k = Ak
σ(1 − τ) − c (46)
˙ q = ρq − σqAk
σ−1(1 − τ) (47)
Since the private agents’ maximization problem is a standard one, the
necessary boundary conditions are well established and they are: k0 given
and limt→∞ kqe−ρt =0 .
Lemma 1: The general solution to equations (45) to (47) has the property
that q1/σk = σ/ρ + Jeρt/σ, with J any constant.
Proof: Let x = q1/σk.T h e nw eh a v e :
˙ x/x =( 1 /σ)˙ q/q + ˙ k/k
= ρ/σ − 1/x
Thus, ˙ x = ρx/σ − 1. This diﬀerential equation has the general solution:
x = σ/ρ + Jeρt/σ, with J any constant.
Remark: The private agents’ maximization problem is a standard concave
optimal control problem and therefore has a unique solution. Thus in order
to show q =[ σ/(ρk)]
σ, it remains to show that the transversality condition
limt→∞ kqe−ρt =0i ss a t i s ﬁed when J =0 .
22Lemma 2: When J =0 , k ≥ 0 and is bounded from above.
Proof: When J =0 ,q1/σk = σ/ρ. Thus, c = ρk/σ. Eq. (46) implies that
−ρk/σ ≤ ˙ k ≤ Ak
σ − ρk/σ.
Since σ < 1, we know that k ≥ 0 and is bounded from above.
Lemma 3: When J =0 , limt→∞ kqe−ρt =0 .
Proof: When J =0 ,q1/σk = σ/ρ.W eh a v e :






=0 . (Lemma 2)
23Appendix C
In this appendix, we solve the government problem of optimal taxation






subject to ˙ a =( 1 − τk)αA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α a − ρa
˙ b = g − τkαA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α a
−τl(1 − α)A[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α (a − b)
+αA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α b
τk ≤ 1
a0 and b0 given
Let λ and µ b et h ec o - s t a t ev a r i a b l e so na and b respectively. Let ν be
the Lagrangian multiplier on τk ≤ 1. The ﬁrst order conditions are
−(λ + µ)αA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α a + ν = 0 (48)








−µ(1 − α)A[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α (a − b)
+µτl(1 − α)A[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α (a − b)
1 − α
α(1 − τl)





ν(1 − τk) = 0 (50)










τkαA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α + τl(1 − α)A[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/αi
˙ µ = ρµ−µτl(1−α)A[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α−µαA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α
The initial boundary conditions and the transversality conditions are
a0 and b0 given
aλe
−ρt → 0a n dbµe
−ρt → 0
From the government’s objective function, we see that it is not optimal
to have a = 0 at any moment. Thus a 6= 0 is always true.
Also, the constraint τk ≤ 1 can not be binding forever. Let T be the
time after which the constraint is not binding (T = 0 is not ruled out at this
moment).
Consider what happens when t ≥ T.B y d e ﬁnition of T,w ek n o wt h a t
ν(t) = 0. Hence from Eq. (48) and the fact that a 6=0 ,w eh a v e
λ + µ =0
And from (49) and the fact that k = a − b>0, we have
τl ≡ 0
Combining the diﬀerential equations on λ and µ and using the fact that





˙ λ = λ
h







=( 1 − τk)αA[(1 − α)A(1 − τl)]
(1−α)/α − ρ + ρ − αA[(1 − α)A]
(1−α)/α
= −τkαA[(1 − α)A]
(1−α)/α
25Since aλ =1 /ρ implies that the LHS of the above equation is zero, it
must be true that τk =0 , for t ≥ T. Therefore whenever τk < 1, τk and
τl must be zero. In order for this to be possible, then we must need the
government to own enough private assets at time T so that the returns on
the assets are just suﬃcient to cover its spending thereafter. In other words,





and b(t) will stay at that level for any t>T.
When t<T , τk =1b yt h ed e ﬁnition of T.E q .( 4 9 )c a n b e s i m p l i ﬁed
and rewritten as follows:
µτl = 0 (52)
Note that −µ has the interpretation of marginal tax excess burden so that µ
is always negative5.H e n c e ,
τl = 0 (53)
Substitute τk =1a n dτl = 0 to the diﬀerential equations on a and b,w eﬁnd
that for t<T,
˙ a = −ρa
˙ b = g − αA[(1 − α)A]
(1−α)/α a + αA[(1 − α)A]
(1−α)/α b
Note that the constant, αA[(1 − α)A]
(1−α)/α , is the pre-tax real interest rate
r, we can simplify and re-arrange the equation above and then multiply both
5If the government starts with a b0 (negative) which generates interest revenue more
than suﬃcient to cover its spending, then µ ≡ 0. As in Chamley [8], we assume that it is
unlikely for the government to have large negative b at time zero. Therefore µ is strictly
negative. Note that µ(t) remains to be negative even after time T when its interest
revenue is just suﬃcient to cover its spending. The reason is that any marginal increase
of government spending will activate the use of distortionary taxes and the distortion is
measured by the excess burden −µ.
26sides by e−rt:
h






Take integral from 0 to T,
bTe


























1w h e nt<T
0w h e nt ≥ T
τl =0 f o r a l l t
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29A List of Symbols
α alpha
τ tau
kα kay subscript alpha









τk tau subscript kay
τl tau subscript el
µ mu
ν nu
R
integral
∞ inﬁnity